Bar Italia - #2
Ten Sips of Italian Politics
Welcome to the latest issue of Bar Italia!
Bar Italia is the newsletter for those interested in Italy and Italian politics but looking for a broader, less detailed overview than The Italian Compass. If you’re curious about why this newsletter is titled “Bar Italia” and how it’s structured, I invite you to read the introduction to the inaugural issue of the old version. As anticipated, Politica Estera has now become a paid project. However, the first three entries of Bar Italia will remain available to all subscribers, while—for the first few weeks—the full issue will become accessible to everyone after five days (on Wednesdays).
As usual, if you’d like to discuss any of the topics covered in this issue, feel free to reach out via email by clicking here. Stay tuned, as in the coming days I will announce the date and time of the first live webinar with Politica Estera readers. The July and August sessions will be open to all subscribers.
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Hope you find it interesting!
Dario
Bar Italia - #2
The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025, held in Rome on July 10–11, marked a critical moment in Italy’s diplomatic engagement on Ukraine. With the participation of fifteen heads of state and government, over 2,000 registered companies, and more than 4,000 attendees, the event underscored Italy’s ambition to play a central role in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
The conference took place amid renewed Russian efforts to escalate violence in Ukraine, again. Just days before the summit, Kyiv endured massive Russian airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties and severe damage to critical infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky used the occasion to call for intensified international assistance, comparing the scale of Ukraine’s reconstruction to a modern-day Marshall Plan. For Europe as a whole, rebuilding Ukraine is not only a humanitarian and economic imperative but also a geopolitical investment in regional stability and post-conflict order. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni used the platform to reaffirm Italy’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, resistance, and long-term recovery.
In a bilateral meeting with Zelensky, Meloni announced new cooperation agreements worth over €10 billion, covering both defense support and infrastructure redevelopment. These initiatives signal Italy’s evolution from a reactive military contributor to a proactive coordinator of Europe’s reconstruction agenda—a role that brings both strategic and domestic advantages and is domestically less controversial than that of military partner. Unlike direct military engagement, which has faced varying degrees of skepticism within the Italian public, reconstruction efforts enjoy broader popular support. Presenting Italy as a partner in rebuilding—a facilitator of investment, innovation, and recovery—has proven far less polarizing than more militarized commitments. Italy’s approach is also influenced by shifting dynamics within the United States. As noted in several occasions, Italy’s stance on Ukraine is a function of Rome’s Atlanticist approach. The recent recalibration of U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on Ukraine—following the turmoil caused by the Department of Defense’s decision to halt military supplies—has, though its permanence remains predictably uncertain, temporarily reduced pressure on Meloni. For Italy, securing a leading role in economic matters and reconstruction offers both strategic relevance and a more politically palatable pathway, domestically, for continued cooperation with Kyiv.
The recent arrest of Xu Zewei, a Chinese national held in Milan under a U.S. warrant, has raised several concerns within Italian political and judicial circles: the specter of diplomatic strain between Italy and China; fears of potential fallout with the United States, should Italy “mess up” again; and echoes of a similar situation experience recently with Iran—only, in this context, involving China, which makes the entire situation way more difficult. Xu is accused of participating in a state-directed cyber espionage campaign targeting U.S. Covid-19 vaccine research. He has denied any wrongdoing, with his lawyers arguing that the case is an instance of mistaken identity. They claim it would be implausible for someone to engage in espionage using their real name—especially as he has a name particularly common in China.
The United States Department of Justice has strongly opposed the possibility of house arrest during Xu’s extradition proceedings, citing serious concerns over his potential flight risk. These concerns are shaped by the precedent of Artem Uss, a Russian citizen wanted by U.S. authorities on charges of smuggling sensitive technology used in Russian weaponry for the war in Ukraine. Uss managed to escape Italian custody while awaiting extradition and returned to Russia, causing considerable diplomatic embarrassment.
This case also bears some resemblance to that of Iranian engineer Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, whom Italy had to release in order to secure the freedom of Italian journalist Cecilia Sala—detained in Iran likely in retaliation for Abedini’s arrest. In that instance, Prime Minister Meloni had to seek direct American support—specifically from Trump himself, as, in early January, he was not yet officially President again—to facilitate the exchange.
With China now involved, the likelihood that the U.S. will attach even greater significance to the issue is much higher, and the room for a solution that satisfies both Washington and Beijing is considerably narrower. China is expected to respond assertively, arguing that a Chinese citizen should not be subject to foreign criminal jurisdiction—especially in cases it views as politically motivated. This stance reflects Beijing’s broader geopolitical posture of contesting U.S. extraterritorial legal reach and defending its nationals abroad, particularly in matters involving espionage or strategic technologies.
For Italy, the Xu Zewei case places it at the intersection of clashing legal obligations and geopolitical pressures, and risks becoming a particularly difficult challenge to manage. On one hand, Rome is bound by specific legal commitments, including its extradition treaty with the United States; on the other, it must navigate the diplomatic fallout of cooperating with Washington in a case that Beijing is likely to view as a serious affront to its sovereignty. While the relationship with the U.S. is obviously essential for Meloni, she has also been considerably cautious in managing relations with China—successfully withdrawing Italy from the Belt and Road Initiative without, so far, triggering major backlash. However, this case may severely test Italy’s ability to strike a sustainable balance among these competing demands.
At the presentation of Mediaset’s programming for the upcoming TV season in Cologno Monzese, Pier Silvio Berlusconi, even if he denied to have the intent of becoming a politician (for now), hinted at a potential increase in his public involvement, outlining a vision for the future of Forza Italia, the party his father, Silvio Berlusconi, founded in the ‘90s (Do you all remember his epic discesa in campo?).
Emphasizing the need for party renewal, he called for the inclusion of “new faces,” particularly among young leaders and local administrators, to reinvigorate its leadership. Berlusconi also acknowledged the differences between his political stance and that of his sister Marina, who has taken a more reserved approach while being slightly more liberal than her brother. Describing himself as a “conservative-progressive,” he stressed the importance of defending personal freedoms while warning against allowing minority issues to dominate the national agenda (In the video below, a teenage Pier Silvio appears alongside Lory Del Santo in a (not-so) hilarious sketch from Drive In, a cult TV show that aired on Fininvest networks during the roaring ’80s. Remember: Politica Estera is also your guide to Italian pop culture—who else would dig up these hidden gems buried in the depths of YouTube for you?)
While recognizing Antonio Tajani’s capabilities, he openly criticized the party leader’s support for the ius scholae proposal, remarking, “I’m more against than for.” Tajani immediately responded saying that this issue is not so central after all. Will Pier Silvio Berlusconi enter politics? Perhaps, I would say (highly) likely. Will Pier Silvio Berlusconi be as succesful as his late father in politics? I would say (highly) unlikely (for a more detailed analysis on this, wait for the forthcoming issue of The Italian Compass).