Bar Italia - #9/2025
Ten Sips of Italian Politics
Welcome to the latest issue of Bar Italia!
Bar Italia is the newsletter for those interested in Italy and Italian politics but looking for a broader, less detailed overview than The Italian Compass. If you’re curious about why this newsletter is titled “Bar Italia” and how it’s structured, I invite you to read the introduction to the inaugural issue.
If you’d like to discuss any of the topics covered in this issue, feel free to reach out via email at info@politicaestera.net. I might not respond today if the football (soccer) stars align as they should, but rest assured you'll have an answer by tomorrow at the latest! (I am joking, I am always available for my Politica Estera readers, even if Napoli is playing to win the Scudetto).
Hope you find it interesting!
Dario
Bar Italia - #9
On May 18, 2025, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni organized a meeting between U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. While this was not their first meeting, it served to advance discussions on U.S.-EU relations, particularly concerning trade tariffs, which are set to expire in July 2025. By positioning Italy as a facilitator in this dialogue, Meloni is clearly pursuing her goal of acting as a transatlantic bridge (see Deep Dive - Meloni’s Transatlantic Bridge: Fragile, but Still Standing)—an effort both Vance and von der Leyen acknowledged and appreciated. Meloni’s supporters were ecstatic, viewing this as a major diplomatic success—“the ultimate diplomatic masterpiece,” in the always “timid” words of Carlo Fidanza, leader of the Fratelli D’Italia’s delegation in the European Parliament. Meanwhile, opposition figures have criticized her approach, claiming it undermines Italy’s interests and accusing her of aligning too closely with the United States. Ellie Schlein, Partito Democratico (PD)’s leader called this meeting a “consolation prize.”
However, this approach is neither entirely new nor particularly innovative. Looking at it from the historical perspective of Italy’s foreign policy, Meloni is primarily aligned with the so-called Atlanticist circle. This was the case under Joe Biden and has remained true with Donald Trump, regardless of ideological differences. What has changed is America’s approach toward Europe, which is why Meloni aims to act as a bridge (she did not need to act as a bridge under Biden). In fact, this alignment reflects the consistent approach taken by every center-right government since the beginning of Italy’s Second Republic: prioritizing the Atlanticist circle over the European one. The same applies to Italy’s stance on Ukraine—an issue that will be explored in more detail in the next issue of The Italian Compass.
The European Commission has revised its growth forecasts downward for 2025, projecting just 0.9 percent growth for the euro area and 1.1 percent for the EU. The revision reflects structural challenges and trade tensions, primarily stemming from the impact of U.S. tariffs and heightened global trade uncertainty. Italy’s economic outlook has also been downgraded: the Commission lowered its growth forecasts for 2025 and 2026 by 0.3 percentage points. As a result, Italy’s GDP is now expected to grow by 0.7 percent in 2025 and 0.9 percent in 2026. On a positive note, Italy is projected to reduce its budget deficit to below 3 percent of GDP by 2026. However, public debt is expected to continue rising, largely due to the lingering fiscal impact of construction-related tax credits under the “Superbonus” scheme.
Italy has enacted a new law tightening citizenship eligibility for individuals with Italian ancestry. Under the revised rules, applicants must now have a parent or grandparent who was an Italian citizen by birth. The measure aims to strengthen ties with Italy and curb misuse of Italian passports. Reportedly, the United States exerted significant pressure in favor of this change, as many citizens from Latin American countries with distant Italian roots had been applying for Italian citizenship, then using their EU passports to enter—and remain in—the U.S. without proper visas.
The Italian Parliament has approved another resolution on the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), underscoring the importance of ongoing dialogue with the European Commission, the request for the eighth funding tranche, and the need for structural revisions to overcome implementation challenges. The resolution also reaffirms the commitment to allocate at least 40 percent of the funds to the southern regions. However, with just over a year remaining before the PNRR deadline, significant delays, a lack of transparency, and persistent data inaccuracies continue to hinder progress—raising serious concerns about Italy’s ability to meet its commitments. The Parliamentary Budget Office has analyzed the implementation status of Mission 6 of the PNRR, focused on the healthcare system, raising several alarms. While the European milestones have been formally met, significant critical issues remain. These include delays in construction projects—particularly in the South—chronic staff shortages, uneven activation of services across regions, and a concrete risk of failing to achieve a more balanced and even territorial development.
A conflict is emerging between Infrastructure Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini and Il Quirinale over anti-Mafia controls related to the construction of the so-called Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina (Strait of Messina Bridge). President Sergio Mattarella excluded a proposed measure from a recent decree that would have centralized anti-Mafia oversight under the Ministry of the Interior. According to Mattarella, applying a special procedure—similar to those used in emergency situations such as earthquakes or major events like the Olympics—is not justified in this case, as it “is not at all more severe than the ordinary rules.” He also pointed out that the proposal aimed to “derogate from some rules provided for by the Anti-Mafia Code”—derogations not permitted under the ordinary rules governing strategic works of national interest. Salvini and his party argue that Parliament should have the final say, despite concerns voiced by coalition allies. He has announced plans to begin construction this summer, emphasizing the bridge’s potential to reduce pollution and traffic, create over 100,000 jobs, and boost economic development in Italy. Completion is expected by 2032. Italy has been discussing the construction of this bridge since the 1960s. Il Ponte sullo Stretto has also been a major cavallo di battaglia—a political flagship—for center-right governments, particularly under Silvio Berlusconi. It is also interesting—and somewhat ironic—that Salvini now champions connecting mainland Italy to Sicily, when in the past he and La Lega were advocating for the creation of new borders, though no one ever quite understood where those of the whimsical Padania would actually be. Was Abruzzo actually considered part of Padania at any point in history? Would Molise exist in this context? Could Gianfranco Miglio’s idea of dividing Italy into Padania, Etruria, and Mediterraneo ever have worked? Is the Garigliano really the dividing line between Europe and the Mediterranean? Does Salvini know what happened around the Garigliano river in 915 a.c.? Does Sicily need a better railway system rather than il Ponte sullo Stretto at the moment? Will this bridge – if actually built – create synergies? (This is a bit of a weird pop culture reference, but if you really want to understand better Italy you should watch the four seasons, as well as the movie, of Boris). Anyway, let’s see if the works are actually starting this coming summer.
UniCredit plans to appeal to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court (known in Italian as TAR) to seek clarity on the Italian government’s application of its "golden powers" in the bank’s proposed acquisition of Banco BPM. The move comes as the deal undergoes parallel assessment at the EU level, with UniCredit aiming to secure an independent evaluation of the government’s intervention. Italy’s golden powers—enshrined in national law—allow the state to impose conditions or block transactions involving strategic sectors such as finance, energy, and defense. In the case of Banco BPM, the government has invoked these powers to set conditions for the acquisition, for instance that UniCredit fully divest from its Russian operations (see Bar Italia - #5)
On May 21, 2025, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) convened the third EU-AU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, bringing together representatives from over 80 governments to advance their strategic partnership ahead of the 7th AU-EU Summit, scheduled for later this year. Italy was represented by Maria Tripodi, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Germany by its new Foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul; and France by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot. By sending an undersecretary, Italy did not convey a strong signal of engagement—particularly notable given that one of Italy’s stated goals for 2025 is to Europeanize the Mattei Plan (see The Italian Compass - #2).
Claudio Corrarati, representing the center-right coalition, has been elected as the new mayor of Bolzano, securing 51.03 percent of the vote in a closely contested election against Juri Andriollo from the center-left, who received 48.97 percent . Voter turnout dropped to 42.8 percent , indicating a significant level of abstention. This victory marks the first time that right-wing parties have gained control of the city—a result the center-right has hailed as a “historic victory.” The Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), which has traditionally opposed the right, in Bolzano has remained neutral, shifting its stance in favor of supporting a stable coalition, reflecting evolving political dynamics. In the nearby city of Merano, Katharina Zeller, always from the SVP, won the mayoral race with support from the PD. However, she will need to negotiate with the center-right to form a governing coalition. Off to a controversial start, Zeller refused to wear the fascia tricolore (the Italian tricolor sash), prompting strong criticisms from the Italian-speaking community.
Over the past few days, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has been particularly active on matters related to Israel and the war in Gaza. Tajani condemned the murder of two Israeli embassy staffers outside a Jewish museum in Washington, D.C., expressing his solidarity on X (formerly Twitter). This statement followed a period of diplomatic tension. Italy strongly condemned the shooting at European diplomats in Jenin by Israeli forces, describing it as “an unacceptable mistake.” The Italian diplomat involved was Alessandro Tutino, Vice Consul in Jerusalem. In response, the Italian Foreign Ministry summoned the Israeli ambassador to Rome, Jonathan Peled. Tajani also called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, emphasizing the urgent need for humanitarian aid and reaffirmed Italy’s support for the Palestinian Authority as a legitimate representative—over Hamas.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani is also currently on an official visit to Mexico (from May 22 to 24, 2025)—the first visit by an Italian foreign minister in a decade. The mission aims to strengthen bilateral relations, with a focus on economic cooperation, joint efforts against organized crime, and cultural diplomacy, particularly in combating the illicit trafficking of cultural goods. Tajani, together with Mexico’s Minister of Economy, Marcelo Ebrard, inaugurated the Italy-Mexico Business Forum in Mexico City.
In recent years, Mexico has become a key pillar of Italy’s engagement with Central and South America. Surprisingly, the current government has not reversed the trend of Latin American disengagement that has characterized all administrations since the government led by Matteo Renzi. This is especially notable given that, historically, Latin America—and the role of Italian communities across the region—has been a top priority for Italy’s right-wing parties.
See also…
Politica Estera - Deep Dive - Meloni’s Transatlantic Bridge: Fragile, but Still Standing
Politica Estera - Deep Dive - The Race for Villa Firenze: Who Will Be Italy’s Next Ambassador to D.C.?
Mediterraneo Globale: La nuova lotta per il potere in Libia
Politica Estera - The Italian Compass - #7/2025
Politica Estera - Bar Italia - #8/2025
Politica Estera - Scriptorium Italiae #2/2025