The Italian Compass - #2/2025
Making sense of Italian foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic risk
Welcome to the second issue of “The Italian Compass”, a weekly newsletter dedicated to analyzing Italian foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic risk. This week, we focus on Italy-Türkiye relations and Meloni’s 2025 goals for her flagship diplomatic initiative, the Mattei Plan.
In the “Briefs” section, you will find two short analyses: one on the “surprising” liberation of the Iranian engineer Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, and the other on the implications for Italy of President-elect Donald Trump’s push for NATO countries to allocate 5% of their GDP to defense expenditure.
Happy reading!
Dario
Summary
At the Dawn of a New Era in Italian-Turkish Relations?
The Mattei Plan: Between Enlargement and Normalization.
Europeanizing the Mattei Plan? Easier said than done.
Briefs
What a Shocker! Abedini is Back in Tehran. Who Could Have Said It?
Trump’s 5% NATO Spending Demand: A Tightrope for Italy?
At the Dawn of a New Era in Italian-Turkish Relations?
The Fact(s):
On January 9, the President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a phone conversation with the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The discussion focused on bilateral relations in preparation for the upcoming intergovernmental summit. The leaders also addressed the situation in the Middle East, with particular attention to Syria. The day after, Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Tajani departed for Damascus, where he met Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jowlani), and held talks with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani. Türkiye, currently the most influential foreign power in Syria, remains a key player in the region, and this coordination with Ankara allowed Italy to better align its approach to Syrian policy.
Meloni and Erdoğan emphasized the importance of a peaceful and inclusive political transition in Syria, ensuring the full integration of all the components of Syrian society while contributing to regional stability and security. The conversation also highlighted opportunities to enhance economic and industrial cooperation. This area has gained particular significance in bilateral relations following the acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace by the Turkish company Baykar.
The Analysis:
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reportedly asked Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to take the lead in advocating for the removal of international sanctions on Syria. This request coincided with the sharply critical remarks made by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who referred to France’s role and interests in Syria as those of a “small European country” hiding behind the US. This dynamic suggests that Erdoğan may currently view Meloni as his preferred partner in Europe and a key interlocutor on Syrian matters. Soner Çağaptay, a leading expert on Türkiye, has suggested that, under Trump, Italy and Türkiye could form a bloc alongside the United States within NATO: a coalition of major powers with shared priorities and a converging agenda. If these dynamics continue, they may signal the beginning of a new era in Italian-Turkish relations.
Interestingly, such a shift would take place under the right-center government led by Meloni, a development that might seem paradoxical at first but is not entirely unexpected. Historically, Italian politicians across the entire political spectrum, from the right to the left, tend to be highly critical of Türkiye, often for ideological and religious reasons, particularly while in opposition. Meloni herself has long been a vocal critic of Erdoğan. She denounced “Erdoğan’s imperialism,” claimed that the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque was evidence of Türkiye’s transformation into an “Islamic Sultanate,” accused Ankara of funding political Islam in Europe, and called for the annulment of Türkiye’s status as an EU membership candidate.
However, once in power, Italian leaders tend to forget their previous positions, swiftly realizing Türkiye’s strategic importance. Economically, the two nations are complementary, with Türkiye being Italy’s largest trading partner in the MENA region. Geopolitically, their interests frequently align, particularly in the Mediterranean, and both nations often find themselves at odds with France. Beyond Syria, Türkiye wields significant influence in other countries critical to Italy, namely Libya, Azerbaijan, and Somalia. Moreover, amusingly enough, Erdoğan recently expressed his appreciation to Meloni for her support of “family values” and opposition to pro-LGBT policies, emphasizing a shared stance on preserving traditional family structures. This alignment suggests a growing convergence between the political and cultural agendas of the two leaders and their respective governments.
What’s Next:
The present diplomatic convergence between Rome and Ankara is poised to evolve into something more substantial, particularly if the “Transatlantic triangle” involving a new Trump administration materializes. For Italy, strengthening ties with Türkiye could partially revive its economic and political influence in Libya, where Ankara has effectively replaced Rome as the primary backer of the Tripoli government. However, the strong existing economic ties and the complementary nature of the two countries’ economies may also give Türkiye a vested interest in collaborating with Italy in Libya. Additionally, as Russia looks to eastern Libya to mitigate some of the strategic losses it has suffered in Syria, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni might have an interest in coordinating with Türkiye to address this emerging problem.
For Meloni, the only challenge might come from certain factions within the government majority. The deepening of Italian-Turkish ties could face some resistance. Forza Italia is unlikely to pose any significant challenges, given its historical, positive ties with Erdoğan. A potential defy, however, could come from Matteo Salvini’s Lega. For Salvini and his party, Erdoğan represents the epitome of the “Islamic threat” at Europe’s doorstep. In 2024, Salvini underscored this narrative by organizing the annual gathering in Pontida, commemorating the Holy League’s victory over the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto in 1571. Facing significant domestic challenges - both in his role as transport minister and as leader of the Lega - Salvini might seek to leverage the deep skepticism of Erdoğan in the Italian public opinion to undermine closer ties between Meloni and the Turkish president. Moreover, some of Fratelli d’Italia’s constituencies might also disapprove Meloni’s pragmatic turn on Erdoğan, and Salvini will likely target them. Erdoğan is often depicted in Italian political discourse as the ultimate “Islamic imperialist,” a label that resonates with many conservative and nationalist voters.
Salvini could exploit this sentiment to attack Meloni and divert attention from his own mounting political difficulties, including growing criticisms of his ministerial performance and party leadership. That being said, this remains more of a hypothetical than an actual political threat. His ability to significantly influence this matter will remain limited. As such, Italian-Turkish cooperation is likely to strengthen in the coming months.
The Mattei Plan: Between Enlargement and Normalization
The Fact(s):
At the beginning of January 2025, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced the expansion of her flagship initiative for Africa, the “Mattei Plan.” Five additional countries - Angola, Ghana, Mauritania, Tanzania, and Senegal - will join the initiative. These nations follow nine other countries - Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia - where Italy has already implemented pilot projects. The Mattei Plan is built on five key pillars: education and training, agriculture, health, energy, and water. The initiative was initially funded with €5.5 billion in grants, credits, and guarantees. Meloni continues to describe the Mattei Plan as a “new approach to Africa,” one that offers an alternative to traditional, mono-directional, and patronizing aid models that have historically characterized the European approach to the continent. She emphasized that the initiative prioritizes African agency and partnerships, and is grounded in a “non-predatory” and “peer-to-peer” logic.
The Analysis:
The fact that the Mattei Plan has not been discarded following the 2024 European elections is already good news. Before the election, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s descriptions of the plan suggested that it was not only intended to spur economic growth and sustainable development in Africa but also served a few domestic, political purposes: to reassure voters that Rome was actively promoting development in African countries to reduce migration to Italy, and show that Italy was competing with the beloved/hated “French cousins” for influence in Africa. As such, some suspected that - once the electoral period was over - attention to the plan might have waned. However, while this has not happened, the current implementation of the plan suggests a partial reduction in the declared ambition and scope.
Initially, the Mattei Plan was framed as a comprehensive initiative aimed at establishing Italy as a “full” African player. Beyond promoting economic development, it was envisioned as a platform for Italy to exert significant geopolitical influence in Africa, with the bold goal of challenging France’s traditional dominance in the continent. In August 2024, Francesco Filini, an MP from Fratelli d’Italia, described the Mattei Plan as “a large-scale geopolitical and geostrategic initiative aimed at rewriting the relationship between the Old Continent and Africa.” To say that this audacious statement was a huge overstatement would be a colossal understatement.
At present, the Mattei Plan lacks a security/geostrategic component. Officials – both in private and public – tend to avoid discussing this aspect when referring to the plan. Instead, the initiative has taken on the characteristics of a more traditional development program. The General Directorate for International Cooperation, led by Mr. Stefano Gatti, has become increasingly central to the management of the plan’s projects. Gatti, appointed by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, was reportedly preferred over Roberto Colaminè, now the Italian ambassador to Indonesia and previously deputy director of the same department. Colaminè is known to have close ties to Deputy Foreign Minister, Edmondo Cirielli from Fratelli d’Italia. Gatti’s background also includes work with Milan Mayor Beppe Sala at Expo 2015, and he is widely respected across party lines. This shift in management also underscores a growing role for the Farnesina in defining and directing the plan. Initially, Palazzo Chigi seemed to dominate the framework and scope of the initiative. The increased involvement of the Foreign Ministry signals instead the emergence of a more standard and institutionalized approach to the plan’s implementation.
What’s Next:
Many of the initial nine countries part of the Mattei Plan are places where Italy has had a well-established economic and diplomatic presence for decades. This foundation provides embassies and local players with the institutional memory, experience and capacity to manage the plan’s projects, despite challenges such as limited funding, understaffed embassies, and logistic problems. The new countries added to the plan, however, present a different set of challenges as they lie slightly outside Italy’s traditional areas of focus. Tanzania, Angola, and Ghana are demographically and economically significant, ranking among the top 15 African economies by GDP in 2024 (Angola 9th, Tanzania 11th, and Ghana 12th, according to the IMF). These nations’ size, and their economic dynamism, make them promising yet challenging partners to engage.
Senegal, under its new and youngest-ever African president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, has launched a 25-year development plan aimed at strengthening economic sovereignty. While this ambitious strategy also presents opportunities, it could make economic cooperation more daunting amid the emphasis on boosting self-reliance in the long-term. Mauritania, on the other hand, while economically and demographically somehow marginal, has gained notable geopolitical relevance in the Maghreb-Sahel security complex under President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. Italy only recently, in 2024, established an embassy in Nouakchott. Foreign Minister Tajani appointed Ms. Laura Bottà as Ambassador, a specialist of complex diplomatic missions as she was previously the Italian ambassador to Mongolia. While the political commitment and “narrative capital” invested by Prime Minister Meloni ensure the Mattei Plan’s future is not in jeopardy, the implementation of these new projects is likely to be more complicated than during the plan’s initial year. As such, the expectations, particularly regarding the political and influence “trickledown” effects of this plan, should remain moderate.
Europeanizing the Mattei Plan? Easier Said than Done
The Fact(s):
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has outlined two further objectives for the Mattei Plan in 2025: its internationalization and Europeanization. The core aim appears to be aligning the initiative with broader European and G7 strategies, as well as fostering cooperation with other international partners such as the United States and the Gulf States. Meloni has also raised this topic in her first meeting with the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. Italy is emphasizing that collaboration on the wider “Southern Neighborhood” and Africa through the Mattei plan could strengthen the European Union’s international projection.
The Analysis:
Integrating the Mattei Plan into a broader European framework is undoubtedly a bright idea, at least theoretically. A key factor in its potential success would be indeed aligning it with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. Launched by the European Commission in December 2021, this initiative seeks to enhance global connectivity by investing in infrastructure, digital development, and human capital worldwide, with Africa identified as a priority region. Under this framework, the EU has already allocated approximately €150 billion to support projects in the continent. As Arturo Varvelli rightly suggested, aligning the Mattei Plan with the Global Gateway could enable Italy to leverage EU resources and facilities, significantly amplifying its impact on the continent. However, this is easier said than done, for several reasons.
First: The Meloni government continues to face challenges in exerting influence within the EU. In Italy, pro-government observers heralded the appointment of Raffaele Fitto as Executive Vice-President of the European Commission as a major success, a development showcasing Meloni’s (alleged) sway in Brussels. This claim is far from reality. Those familiar with Brussels debates are aware that, while Meloni is unquestionably one of Europe’s most stable leaders, her influence in Brussels remains limited. A significant obstacle is her lack of affiliation with one of the major, long-standing “political families” that dominate European politics. This reduces her ability to play a decisive role in shaping EU strategies. That said, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani’s networks and political weight in Brussels, particularly in the European People’s Party (EPP) provide some degree of balance (see: the Italian Compass #1). Second: On a broader level, Italy lacks the “bureaucratic weight” inside EU institutions that other countries, for instance France, have long enjoyed. However, this issue cannot be attributed to the current government, as it is a more structural and long-standing problem.
What’s Next:
It is thus unlikely that Italy will successfully fully “Europeanize” the Mattei Plan. The factors outlined above - some contingent, others more structural – indicate that Italy will face significant obstacles in promoting the plan’s Europeanization, particularly as it is often framed domestically as an initiative to reduce or replace French influence in Africa. Those familiar with the history of the EEC/EU’s engagement in the Mediterranean and Africa understand that this is an area where France traditionally takes the lion’s share of influence. Despite the current challenges France is experiencing, it is unlikely to relinquish this dominant role. Paris will also try to contain Italy on this not only inside the communitarian structures, but also at the more intergovernmental level, in the Council of the European Union.
Outside the EU, Italy may find alternative partners, such as the Gulf countries. These actors possess substantial economic resources, have a geopolitical interest in expanding their presence in Africa, and might be open to cooperating with Italy. However, such partnerships would likely take the form of ad hoc collaborations on specific projects rather than a full internationalization of the Mattei Plan. Another potential partner for Italy in Africa might be Turkey. Ankara’s presence on the continent is far more structured than that of Gulf countries. While Turkey might still cooperate with Italy in certain areas in Africa, its need for additional support to advance its African goals is not so significant.
Briefs
What a Shocker! Abedini is Back in Tehran. Who Could Have Said It?
On January 12, 2025, Minister of Justice Carlo Nordio signed a request to revoke the arrest of Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, the Iranian engineer arrested at Malpensa Airport on December 16, 2024. Abedini had been arrested at the request of the United States on charges of violating international sanctions by allegedly using advanced technologies for military purposes and maintaining ties to organizations accused of terrorist activities, namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The Italian government decided not to proceed with the extradition, citing two main reasons: the lack of concrete evidence supporting the charges and the fact that the alleged crimes were not recognized as offenses under Italian law. Both issues were, in any case, apparent already at the time of Abedini’s initial arrest. It is surprising that some people in Italy were surprised by the outcome of this case. Giorgia Meloni still did the right thing by working to bring Cecilia Sala back as quickly as possible. Yet, while the current government may have received the green light from both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations, this decision is still likely to complicate bureaucratic cooperation with the United States in the months ahead.
Trump’s 5% NATO Spending Demand: A Tightrope for Italy?
President-elect Donald Trump has announced that NATO members should increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, emphasizing that European allies are underpaying for U.S. protection. If implemented, such a decision could have far-reaching diplomatic and geopolitical consequences. For Italy, in particular, this directive might place the current government in a difficult position.
Answering during the Question Time in the Chamber of Deputies on January 8, 2025, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto stated that “reaching 5% is impossible for everyone.” In 2024, Italy’s military spending reached 1.5% of GDP, over €30 billion, and the government projects a slight increase to 1.57% in 2025. The Italian government has repeatedly advocated for defense expenses to be excluded from the Stability Pact’s budgetary constraints or for the creation of shared European debt through Eurobonds to finance these expenditures.
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni enjoys what she has described as a “solid and privileged relationship” with Trump. However, Trump, like any self-respecting businessman, when it comes to business, doesn’t let anything or anyone stand in his way. If he truly pushes for this 5% target, the situation could become problematic for Italy for two main reasons. First, the close relationship between Meloni and Trump would inevitably come under strain. Second, Italy’s argument that its NATO contribution is “expansive” (the second-highest in terms of troops involved in NATO operations) rather than purely “expensive” could lose its appeal. Bridging – or pretending to bridge – a 0.5% gap with troop contributions is one thing; compensating for a shortfall of 3.5% is a totally different story.
See also…
Mediterraneo Globale - Visioni transatlantiche sul successo turco in Siria
Politica Estera - The Italian Compass #1/2025
Mediterraneo Globale - La Settimana Mediterranea - 2/2025
Politica Estera - Scriptorium Italiae #1/2025
Mediterraneo Globale - La Settimana Mediterranea - Speciale "Correnti 2025"
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