The Italian Compass - #4/2025
Making sense of Italian foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic risk
Welcome to the new issue of “The Italian Compass”, a weekly newsletter dedicated to analyzing Italian foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic risk. This week we explore the broader meaning of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. We also discuss the first phone conversation, with their different readouts, between the new U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, and examine Italy-Portugal relations, highlighting the potential role of Lisbon as a partner for the Mattei Plan.
In the “Briefs” section, you will find two short analyses: one on the Almasri affair and its implications for Italy’s approach to international law, historically a systemic, fundamental pillar in Rome’s foreign policy; and one on the domestic debate regarding Italy’s military readiness.
If you want to discuss some of the issues analyzed in the newsletter, feel free to contact me using the message button at the end of the email.
Happy reading!
Dario
Summary
Italy Claims its Spot in the Multipolar Gulf.
Rubio-Tajani First Phone Conversation: Same Call, Different Readouts.
Can Portugal be the surprising European partner for the Mattei Plan?
Briefs
Does the Almasri Affair Signal a Shift in Italy’s Approach to International Law?
Italy’s Military Readiness Remains a Concern.
Italy Claims its Spot in the Multipolar Gulf
The Fact(s):
From January 25 to 27, 2025, Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia, where she met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler, as well as officials in Bahrain. During the visit, Italy signed agreements worth approximately $10 billion as part of an enhanced strategic partnership. Key areas of bilateral cooperation include infrastructure, energy, defense, sports, entertainment, and tourism, with both sides aiming to deepen and strengthen their collaboration in these sectors. Meloni and bin Salman also discussed efforts to achieve a “just and lasting peace in Ukraine,” the consolidation of the ceasefire in Gaza, support for post-war reconstruction in Syria, and assistance to Lebanon. Additionally, Rome expressed its support for Saudi Arabia’s potential inclusion in the GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) jet fighter project, in which Rome is cooperating with the U.K. and Japan, though it acknowledged that this process would take time
The Analysis:
Meloni’s visit to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is significant for several reasons. It reflects Italy’s broader effort to strengthen its presence in a region where it has historically played a limited role. For decades, Rome’s approach to the Gulf was largely shaped by its alignment with U.S. policy, with the notable exception of its traditionally friendly ties with Islamist Iran. Regarding the Arab monarchies, Italy was long perceived as being primarily oriented toward Qatar, particularly thanks to the role played by Fincantieri in the country. Against this backdrop, the polarization of regional relations, intensified by the Arab Spring and culminating in the Qatar blockade (2017-2021), complicated Rome’s diplomatic maneuvers. Italy’s relations with key regional players, particularly the United Arab Emirates, reached an all-time low in 2021 following Rome’s controversial retroactive suspension of arms supplies to the UAE and Abu Dhabi’s subsequent refusal landing to an Italian military plane as it headed to Afghanistan in June that year.
Since then, however, the situation has changed significantly. Relations with the UAE have been restored, as evidenced by several high-level visits to Abu Dhabi (March 2023/January 2025) all without jeopardizing ties with Qatar. Now, deepening relations with Saudi Arabia and elevating them to a strategic partnership marks another step forward in Italy’s ambition to play a greater role in the Gulf and, consequentially in the so-called Enlarged Mediterranean. This shift is part of a broader strategy to strengthen ties with a region that is becoming increasingly vital for Italy’s national interests and global stability. The Gulf’s growing geostrategic importance extends beyond the Mediterranean, as it is also emerging as a critical link between Europe and the emerging Indo-Pacific security complex, particularly through the IMEC connectivity corridor.
What’s Next:
Italy will continue to work to expand its presence in the Gulf, with its relationship with Saudi Arabia serving as a cornerstone of this strategy. This partnership is also expected to extend to Africa, as Gulf countries (see The Italian Compass #2) could become key partners in helping Italy internationalize aspects of its Mattei Plan. That said, Italy is just one of many countries increasing their engagement in the region. This development is welcomed by the Saudi leadership, which is seeking to enhance its strategic autonomy by diversifying its foreign policy.
Recognizing that the U.S. is no longer as focused on the Gulf as it once was, Riyadh has strengthened ties with China, pursued a rapprochement with Iran and Turkey, and deepened relations with several European nations as well. For example, France and Saudi Arabia established the Strategic Partnership Council in December 2024, and President Macron recently announced that France and Saudi Arabia will co-chair a conference in June 2025 on establishing a Palestinian state.
Media sympathetic to the current government speculate that, given the close relationship between Meloni and Trump, as well as the alleged strong ties between Trump and Crown Prince bin Salman, Italy could eventually play a pivotal role in encouraging Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. However, this remains a long shot for Rome at the moment. While bringing Riyadh into this framework is a shared goal of both the U.S. and European countries, Italy does not yet possess the geopolitical influence in the region to be a potential actor in such a process.
Rubio-Tajani First Phone Conversation: Same Call, Different Readouts
The Fact(s):
On January 26, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Antonio Tajani, held their first official phone call. The respective official readouts of the conversation differed slightly in tone and detail. The Italian readout was notably more eloquent, covering a variety of topics discussed during the call. Tajani emphasized that “the relationship with the United States is fundamental to Italian foreign policy.” In contrast, the U.S. readout was far more concise, with Secretary Rubio reaffirming the importance of the U.S.-Italy alliance for America’s safety, security, and prosperity, and with the statement primarily focused on Rubio’s emphasis on “the importance of real burden-sharing among all NATO Allies.”
The Analysis:
If the scheduling and order of Secretary Rubio’s calls reflect the new administration’s priorities, it appears that Europe is not at the core of its current strategic focus. However, in this context, Italy ranked relatively well compared to other European countries.
The American readout’s focus on NATO and “real burden sharing” suggests that, while the relationship between Prime Minister Meloni and former President Trump may indeed be “special” due to political and personal affinities, Italy will not necessarily be exempt from the renewed U.S. push for fairer burden-sharing within NATO. This issue had already been identified as one of the potential friction points in the evolving Italian-American relationship (see The Italian Compass #2/The Italian Compass #3).
On this issue, Foreign Minister Tajani asserted that “NATO remains the pillar of Euro-Atlantic security.” He emphasized Italy’s commitment to being a key contributor to Alliance missions and encouraged greater European responsibility for defense. Minister Tajani also reiterated Italy’s support for a just peace in Ukraine and raised concerns about hybrid warfare threats. As for the Middle East, he reaffirmed Italy’s backing of Israel’s right to self-defense and recognized the importance of the agreement between Israel and Hamas, while stressing the need for a broader regional security framework that also includes Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, Tajani addressed the Indo-Pacific, reiterating Italy’s opposition to any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, a sign that Italy wants to let the Americans know that it is ready to play a role in this context as well.
What’s Next:
As previously noted, Italian-American relations are particularly strong at the moment and the Rubio-Tajani phone call, despite the different readouts analyized above, confirms that. However, some challenges may arise, particularly in the areas of economy, trade and judiciary/bureaucratic cooperation. Key issues include U.S. pressure on Italy to increase its defense spending, and the potential risks of tariffs and a trade war between the U.S. and Europe. Regarding the latter, Rome is actively developing a strategy to minimize the impact on its direct exports to the U.S., but tariffs on EU products will inevitably affect Italy, even if just indirectly. Lastly, the effects of Abedini case (see The Italian Compass #1/ The Italian Compass #2) will likely have some adverse consequences on the standard, day-to-day judicial and police cooperation over the coming months.
Can Portugal be the surprising European partner for the Mattei Plan?
The Fact(s):
On January 24, 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Antonio Tajani, and the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paulo Rangel, held a meeting at the Farnesina, during which they discussed key issues of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Both Ministers highlighted the deep partnership existing between Rome and Lisbon, both at a bilateral level and within the EU and NATO. Their discussions covered various topics, ranging from the situation in Mozambique to recent developments in the Middle East and Ukraine.
They emphasized the importance of working together on the implementation of the EU’s Global Gateway, in synergy with the Mattei Plan and Portugal’s cooperation strategy. Additionally, they stressed the potential of key sectors such as the blue economy, space, defense, and energy to inject new momentum into bilateral cooperation.
The Analysis:
This meeting is relevant for two main reasons. First, the personal relationship between Tajani and Rangel is noteworthy, and shows how relevant the ties that Tajani built in his Brussels years are for his current role (see The Italian Compass #1). Like Tajani, Rangel built his political career primarily in the EU institutions. He served as a Member of the European Parliament from 2009 until 2024, when he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also a key figure within the European People’s Party (EPP), having served as treasurer under the leadership of its president, Manfred Weber. Tajani and Rangel have already collaborated on several issues in the past, including efforts to strengthen the EU’s civil protection mechanism.
Second, looking ahead, there is another factor worth highlighting: the potential impact of Italian-Portugal cooperation on the Mattei plan, particularly concerning Italy’s ambition “Europeanize” this project. As previously discussed (see the Italian Compass #2), achieving this goal may be challenging, at least in the short term. However, Portugal could be an especially valuable partner for Italy in pushing in this direction. Even if it is not among the biggest member states, at the European level Portugal often punches above its political weight.
For example, during its Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2021, Lisbon leveraged the opportunity to advance the implementation of the European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM) in Mozambique. This initiative built upon Portugal’s already existing training mission aimed at enhancing Mozambique’s military capabilities and establishing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Furthermore, Portugal can be a valuable strategic partner for Italy’s broader objectives in Africa. In addition to its strong ties with Mozambique, Portugal has deep-rooted relations with several African nations—most notably Angola—which could prove particularly beneficial for Italy’s ambitions in the region.
What’s Next?
The personal dynamic between Tajani and Rangel will inevitably influence Italy-Portugal relations in the coming months and could facilitate deeper cooperation, on top of the ideological affinity between the two governments. Furthermore, looking at the upcoming second phase of the Mattei Plan, Angola is expected to be a key recipient country. As a former Portuguese colony, Angola has maintained a strategic partnership with Portugal since 1991, when Lisbon played a key role in mediating the international peace process. Although the European economic crisis of 2008-2013 altered the dynamics between the two countries and somewhat rebalanced their economic relationship, Portugal remains a crucial player in shaping EU-Angola relations.
For Italy, this is an important factor to consider, especially given the growing intra-European competition in Angola. In January 2025, Angolan President João Lourenço paid an official visit to France, where he met with French President Emmanuel Macron and signed agreements and partnerships worth a total of €430 million . Macron emphasized France’s desire to expand cooperation beyond the agricultural and critical industries sectors, highlighting infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor. Amid challenges in its relations with former colonies and Francophone countries in Africa, France has been actively strengthening ties with other African countries, not only Angola, but also other major continental players, for instance Nigeria.
Currently, Italy’s presence is limited, and its primary foothold in Angola comes from the presence of ENI, which has built a significant role in the country’s energy sector over the years. A deepening partnership with Portugal could thus help Rome broaden and strengthen its influence in Angola, making the Mattei plan slightly more robust.
Briefs
Does the Almasri Affair Signal a Shift in Italy’s Approach to International Law?
Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Justice Minister Carlo Nordio, Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi, and the Prime Minister’s Undersecretary, Alfredo Mantovano, are under investigation by Rome prosecutors over the country’s release and repatriation of Libyan General Osama Almasri Njeem, wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his role in handling the Mitiga prison in Libya.
On January 18, 2025, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Almasri, who was subsequently arrested on January 19 in Italy. However, he was released from custody and transported back to Libya on a state flight on January 21, without prior notice or consultation with the ICC. On January 23, Piantedosi explained that he had issued “an expulsion order for reasons of state security.” The Rome prosecutors’ decision has (re)opened a conflict between the executive and the judiciary, with Meloni openly accusing judges of seeking to “govern” and substitute political power, stating that “politicized judges try to target those who do not align with them.”
However, the focus here is not on the domestic implications of this situation but on its significance for Italy’s international stance. Historically, respect for international law has been a cornerstone of Italy’s approach to international politics, an element consistently reaffirmed in major speeches by Italian leaders, regardless of their political affiliations. The Almasri case, along with some other recent developments, raises the question of whether Italy is beginning to shift its stance, aligning with broader trends and a more general international approach that no longer seems to regard international law as so important.
Responding to the ICC’s request for clarification, Meloni stated that Italy would seek further explanations from the ICC, particularly regarding the timing of the arrest warrant, which was issued after Almasri had visited several European countries. Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani reinforced Italy’s stance, asserting that the country is a sovereign state free to make its own decisions within its territory. He remarked: “The Hague is not the Gospel. It’s not the Mouth of Truth,” adding, “It’s possible to have different opinions. Italy is not in check by anyone. We are a sovereign country, and we carry out our policy.” This also comes in the wake of Italy’s January 2025 announcement that it will not enforce ICC arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Galant, joining France and other European ICC signatories in offering them immunity from prosecution.
In the Libyan case, security considerations are evidently at play, particularly concerning the nature of Italy’s agreements with Libya on migration management. However, the explicit language used by Tajani and Meloni against the ICC marks a first for Italian leadership. While their statements do not yet constitute a definitive shift in Italy’s approach to international law and institutions, they are noteworthy. It remains to be seen whether they reflect an isolated incident specific to this case or signal a broader change in Italy’s international stance.
Italy’s Military Readiness Remains a Concern
Addressing the Italian Parliament, General Carmine Masiello, Chief of Staff of the Army since February 2024, expressed serious concerns about the readiness of the Italian Army. According to the General, Italy would currently struggle to handle a conflict similar to those unfolding in Ukraine or the Middle East due to a range of issues, including: a shortage of heavy weaponry, mobile artillery, long-range missiles such as HIMARS, and tanks, as well as a lack of air defense, missile defense, and anti-drone systems.
In addition to equipment shortages, the Army is also facing a critical workforce shortage. While the trend of reducing defense personnel has been reversed bringing the total slightly above 93,000 military personnel, this number remains far below what is needed, with something between 40,000 and 45,000 units missing. General Masiello considers these numbers inadequate to meet operational requirements, particularly in the event of a high-intensity conflict, which would demand the capacity to sustain and regenerate combat forces. The limitations of the current National Defense Military Plan (Piano Militare di Difesa Nazionale) have become even more evident when assessed against NATO’s capability targets for 2025.
The lack of military readiness is a longstanding issue, but the war in Ukraine and growing global instability have pushed it back to the top of the political agenda. Moreover, with the new U.S. administration, there is additional pressure to increase defense spending. However, fiscal constraints remain severe, and military expenditures continue to be viewed negatively by a significant portion of public opinion. As a result, a substantial breakthrough in defense investment appears unlikely in the near future.
See also…
Politica Estera - The Italian Compass #3/2025
Mediterraneo Globale - Marocco, Algeria e Stati Uniti: un equilibrio impossibile sotto Trump?
Mediterraneo Globale - Trump fa sul serio sul disimpegno in Medio Oriente? Osservazioni dalle prime nomine
Mediterraneo Globale - La Settimana Mediterranea - 4/2025
Politica Estera - Scriptorium Italiae #1/2025
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