Bar Italia - #8/2025
Ten Sips of Italian Politics.
Welcome to the latest issue of Bar Italia!
Bar Italia is the newsletter for those interested in Italy and Italian politics but looking for a broader, less detailed overview than The Italian Compass. If you’re curious about why this newsletter is titled “Bar Italia” and how it’s structured, I invite you to read the introduction to the inaugural issue.
If you’d like to discuss any of the topics covered in this issue, feel free to reach out via email at info@politicaestera.net.
Hope you find it interesting!
Dario
Bar Italia - #8
After her session in the Senate, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni held another question time—on May 14, 2025, this time in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, where most of the opposition leaders are present. Meloni had several heated exchanges, particularly with Elly Schlein, Secretary of the Partito Democratico (PD), and Giuseppe Conte, leader of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S). Schlein criticized Meloni over the state of the healthcare system, claiming it is in crisis, while Meloni defended her government’s funding decisions and accused Schlein of spreading misinformation. Meloni and former Prime Minister Conte clashed over military spending, with Meloni criticizing Conte’s past support for increased military budgets, and Conte accusing Meloni of betraying Italy by prioritizing military expenditures over essential public services. However, beyond the theatrics, the opposition is currently not particularly effective in draining Meloni’s support or in challenging her on specific policy issues. Conte’s theatrical gesture—a minute of silence for Gaza—did not prove particularly impactful, and was even criticized by other members of the opposition. However, his “pacifist” rhetoric is helping him siphon voter intentions from the PD. Meloni can sleep tight as long as the M5S and PD continue to draw votes from each other. Her sleep might be disturbed by others, more likely inside her coalition.
Indeed, Deputy Prime Ministers Matteo Salvini and Antonio Tajani were not present in the Chamber during Meloni’s question time. While the Forza Italia leader was in Turkey for a NATO meeting, even if he seems to be allegedly upset with some of Meloni’s moves on Ukraine, the League leader was instead seen attending the Internazionali d’Italia tennis tournament in Rome. Salvini is a well-known sports enthusiast, and later that evening, he also attended the Coppa Italia Final, in which his beloved Milan lost 1–0 to Bologna. Unlucky period for Salvini. Granted, tennis and football (soccer) are important—but perhaps some tension is beginning to build within the executive and Salvini wants to show that this tension is actually building (of course, in his own way).
Well. Indeed, there is tension inside the government. Not only for the choices for regional and local elections, but on many other issues. The government postponed a crucial cabinet meeting over disagreements on port concession regulations, specifically on Genova, highlighting internal divisions within the ruling coalition. Undersecretary Alfredo Mantovano and Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti signaled their opposition to the measure initially pushed by Salvini and his deputy at the Ministry of Infrastructure, Edoardo Rixi. There are also ongoing tensions between Salvini and Prime Minister Meloni regarding the implications of a Constitutional Court ruling on the third term limit for the presidents of special statute regions. Salvini had to accept the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the Campania law, which also dashed Luca Zaia’s hopes in Veneto (See the Italian Compass #7). However, he is now at least trying to defend the prerogatives of the special statute regions, starting with Maurizio Fugatti position in Trentino. “I hope the government does not challenge Trentino’s law,” reiterated Salvini, days ahead of the next Cabinet meeting, which will decide whether to contest the law. Meanwhile, Massimiliano Fedriga is also watching closely from the sidelines, ready to run for a third term in Friuli-Venezia Giulia if Trentino prevails.
Salvini knows that he needs to keep his governors quiet and possibly happy, one way or another. The fact that Luca Zaia, Veneto’s governor, cannot run for an additional term is creating serious problems within the party. The Veneto leader is among the most critical Lega members regarding the new course charted by the Secretary. The appointment of Roberto Vannacci and Silvia Sardone—the first woman ever in this position—as vice-secretaries is stirring internal tensions, highlighting discontent among many party members, especially long-time militants. This move was facilitated by a recent statutory update that allows for more vice-secretaries and waives the previous requirement of ten years of membership, specifically to accommodate Vannacci. For Vannacci, this development marked a significant shift from his previous positions, as he initially wanted to maintain a strategic distance from the party, avoiding formal affiliation. However, while he announced that he will visit Lega’s historical leader, Umberto Bossi, he claimed that the party is the only truly “Italian sovereignist party” capable of enacting real change in Italy, and he will not renounce his love for the Decima Mas.
Notably, during the question time, Prime Minister Meloni expressed her disapproval of Israeli military actions in Gaza and delivered a strong criticism of Netanyahu’s government, urging Israel to respect international law, although she stated that she would not recall the Italian ambassador. Her remarks were particularly sharp compared to her previous positions and declarations. This tougher rhetoric is likely due to an awareness that the current U.S. administration, as demonstrated in recent weeks, is partially shifting its stance on Netanyahu. It has taken several steps—notably in negotiations with Iran and dialogue with Syria’s new interim president, Ahmed al-Shaara—that are not particularly welcomed by Israel. This evolving American position provides greater room for maneuver on an issue where Italian governments—regardless of ideological orientation—have aligned with the United States in recent years. This contrasts with a more distant past, particularly during the 1980s, when Italy maintained a more autonomous stance on Mediterranean issues, particularly on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Tensions is rising between Italy and Germany as German media report the Social Democratc Party (SPD) has pushed to eliminate Italy from the strategic countries in the government coalition pact. Tajani, criticized the choice, saying that is an anti-European one, stressing how the new Chancellor, the CDU-CSU Friedrich Merz “wants to have an excellent relationship with Italy.”
Marco Osnato—Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and head of the economic department in Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia—endorsed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)’s bid to acquire Mediobanca. He told Bloomberg News that the Monte Paschi–Mediobanca deal “could merge a specific characteristic of our economy—that is, small and medium enterprises—which Monte Paschi has represented very well in recent years through a very active management, along with an investment bank.” Monte Paschi made a bid to acquire Mediobanca, in a deal that valued the firm at roughly €13.4 billion ($15.2 billion).
Defense issues remain at the top of the Italian political agenda. Prime Minister Meloni announced she is taking time to consider the ReArm initiative, with a decision expected in June (likely, Quirinale’s pressure on this has had some effects…). Speaking at a NATO meeting in Türkiye, Foreign Minister Tajani announced that Italy has officially reached the NATO benchmark of spending 2% of its GDP on defense, with oppositions asking how this could have happened almost overnight. The government has not yet announced any budget adjustments to accommodate this increase. Economy Minister Giorgetti suggested that Italy might already be close to the 2% target by changing how military spending is calculated, potentially including costs from the Coast Guard and cybersecurity. However, NATO allies must agree on these accounting methods, and convincing them may be challenging (and Italy is already known for being fiscally imaginative when it comes to defense spending). Before this, Italy used to spend about 1.6% of its GDP on defense. NATO, however, is now debating a potential increase in spending targets, possibly as high as 5%. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte floated a proposal to allocate 3.5% of GDP to military capabilities and 1.5% to broader security investments. However, Tajani argued for a different distribution: 3% for military efforts and 2% for wider security, including cyber infrastructure, ports, airports, railways, and highways.
During the second Italy-Greece intergovernmental summit, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis reaffirmed the strong cooperation on defense, security, and migration issues, while also expressing commitment to supporting Ukraine. Italy and Greece signed 14 agreements across various sectors, including railway infrastructure, energy interconnections, and drug enforcement cooperation. However, while bilateral relations remain generally positive, Italy’s cooperation with Türkiye is worrying Athens. Ekathimerini reported that Greece was preparing a formal protest against Italy, claiming that Rome bypassed European regulations by approving the sale of Piaggio Aerospace to Turkey’s Baykar without notifying EU partners. Striking a balance might be complicated for Rome but, at the moment, the relationship with Ankara seems to have priority.
On May 14, 2025, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a seminar titled “Italy and Central Asia”: a platform for dialogue among diplomats, scholars, students, and policy experts, with the shared goal of exploring ways to deepen avenues of political, economic, and cultural cooperation. The event was opened by Deputy Foreign Minister, Fratelli d’Italia’s Edmondo Cirielli, Italy’s leading official on this topic, and emphasized Italy’s prominent role in fostering dialogue and cooperation with Central Asian partners. He also recalled that Italy was the first EU member state to institutionalize a regular consultation mechanism with the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan —through the innovative “1+5” format. All very interesting—and engaging Central Asia is indeed important for Italy. It was so important that Giorgia Meloni was scheduled to visit Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on April 25, Italy’s Liberation Day, before she had to cancel her trip due to the death of Pope Francis. However, not only was the topic notable—so was the partner of this event. The seminar was organized in collaboration with a specific geopolitical research center called “Vision and Global Trends,” whose chairman is Tiberio Graziani. There is not much information on its website about the actual members of this research center (although, if someone digs a little bit might find interesting names affiliated with this center… if you want to know more, happy to discuss this in private). Graziani is, however, extremely well-known in the world of Italian geopolitical studies. The center’s production focuses significantly on concepts like multipolarity and publishes, among other things, works such as Orizzonti d’Eurasia (Eurasian Horizons) and Heartland – Storia e Teoria della Geopolitica (Heartland – History and Theory of Geopolitics). Multipolarity. Eurasianism. Heartland. Mmmmm. This sounds very… Серьёзно? Александр, это ты, что ли? Скажи мне “правду”! Ops, pardon my Russian… I wrote: “Really? Aleksandr, is it you, or what? Tell me the “Pravda (Truth).” If you understand Italian and you’d like to hear a de profundis of NATO, the United States, of everything that can be considered West, Тиберио (Tiberio) has you covered.
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