Bar Italia - #10/2025
Ten Sips of Italian Politics
Welcome to the latest issue of Bar Italia!
Bar Italia is the newsletter for those interested in Italy and Italian politics but looking for a broader, less detailed overview than The Italian Compass. If you’re curious about why this newsletter is titled “Bar Italia” and how it’s structured, I invite you to read the introduction to the inaugural issue. Napoli ended up winning the Scudetto, as you probably already know. So, this week has been slightly happier than the past months.
If you’d like to discuss any of the topics covered in this issue, feel free to reach out via email at info@politicaestera.net.
Hope you find it interesting!
Dario
Bar Italia - #10
Il Messaggero and Il Foglio both reported, on the same day, that the Italian government is considering appointing Massimo Ambrosetti, currently the Italian ambassador to China, as the next ambassador to Washington, D.C. The term of the current ambassador, Mariangela Zappia, is set to end in June 2025, after having already been renewed for one year. According to these reports, Mario Vattani—the name many within the government, especially in Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), would like to see in Washington—may instead be headed to Tokyo. Nothing is official yet—this whole process works a bit like a Conclave: no white smoke so far, and the list of favorites can still change quickly. But you, readers of Politica Estera, already knew that Ambrosetti was the Farnesina’s “dark horse” for the D.C. post (see: Deep Dive - The Race for Villa Firenze: Who Will Be Italy’s Next Ambassador to D.C.?). How does it feel to know things months before everyone else?
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has finally visited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Originally scheduled for April 25–26, the trip was postponed due to the funeral of Pope Francis. This marks President Meloni’s first visit to Central Asia, and the fact that it was initially planned for April 25—Italy’s Liberation Day—highlights the importance she places on the region. Meloni first traveled to Samarkand, where she met with the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, before continuing to Astana.
In the Kazakh capital, the Prime Minister took part in the International Forum and held a bilateral meeting with the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. On May 30, she also participated in the summit between Italy and all five Central Asian countries—the first meeting of its kind at the level of heads of state and government within the 1+5 format.
Tension is rising again between Giancarlo Giorgetti and Antonio Tajani over the golden power issue and the handling of UniCredit’s operations in Russia. Economy Minister Giorgetti emphasizes the need for strict oversight under the Golden Power regulations, while Foreign Minister Tajani advocates for a more flexible approach to support Italian businesses still operating in Moscow. Giorgetti has stated that he would resign if overruled on the Golden Power conditions the government has attached to UniCredit’s bid for the smaller bank Banco BPM, stressing that without Prime Minister Meloni’s full backing on the issue, he would step down immediately. Tajani has expressed concern over the impact of Golden Power regulations on UniCredit’s presence in Russia, emphasizing the importance of protecting Italian businesses and their interests amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. La Repubblica reported that Tajani has returned to challenge the Golden Power restrictions, prompted by a report he received on April 12, signed by Amb. Cecilia Piccioni, the Italian ambassador to Moscow. In the document, the ambassador warns of the risks tied to UniCredit’s potential exit from Russia. “If UniCredit’s presence in the country were to cease, one section reads, the consequences would be serious for the functioning of the Italian system—both public and private—as well as for third-country operators who rely on this credit institution. The most affected would be the 250 Italian businesses still operating in Russia, which are already under pressure from international sanctions.” Meanwhile, three companies based in the United Arab Emirates are reportedly seeking to acquire UniCredit’s Russian operations, according to a document currently under review by the Economy Ministry, an element that has also increased concerns in some parts of the Italian political and economic world.
Speaking in the Italian Parliament, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani condemned the violent escalation in Gaza as “unacceptable.” He emphasized the urgent need for humanitarian aid and a ceasefire, rejected accusations of complicity in the conflict, and reaffirmed Italy’s commitment to supporting Palestinian civilians and promoting a two-state solution. Tajani also voiced concern over the resurgence of antisemitism, stressing that the actions of the Israeli government should not be attributed to the Jewish community. He further highlighted the Italian government's active role in the region, noting that praise from Palestinian representatives reflects its efforts. During the session, Partito Democratico (PD) deputy Peppe Provenzano criticized Tajani for what he called an inadequate response to the crisis in Gaza, urging the government to take concrete action rather than rely on rhetoric. He also questioned Italy’s position on recognizing Palestinian statehood and the possibility of sanctions against Israeli officials.
However, the Gaza war continues to expose the contrasting approaches within the progressive and centrist factions of the Italian opposition, as they prepare for separate demonstrations in Rome and Milan—each with differing emphases on antisemitism and the actions of Hamas. Some voices focus on condemning Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while others stress the importance of Israel’s security. The two rallies—one in San Giovanni, Rome, centered on criticizing Netanyahu, and a smaller one in Milan, emphasizing support for Israel’s security and the fight against antisemitism—clearly illustrate these divisions. The Democratic Party (PD) is internally split, with some members planning to attend both protests in an effort to balance competing viewpoints. While there is broad concern about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, deeper structural disagreements persist over how to respond politically. These entrenched divisions on foreign policy represent a serious credibility problem for the center-left. Although the center-right also faces internal disagreements on these issues, it generally manages to contain or downplay them—something center-left leaders either cannot, or choose not to, do.
Silvia Salis, supported by a wide coalition of left-wing and centrist parties, has been elected as the new mayor of Genoa, defeating center-right candidate Pietro Piciocchi and bringing an end to nearly eight years of center-right administration in the city. The center-left also secured a victory in Ravenna. In the other two provincial capitals where voting took place—Taranto and Matera—a run-off will be held in two weeks. However, those interpreting these results as indicative of broader national trends are likely mistaken. Ravenna was never seriously at risk, while Genoa has unique political dynamics that make it an unreliable benchmark for national politics. Certainly, Salis’s victory—along with her political and media style and her ability to hold together a broad and diverse coalition—is remarkable, but difficult to replicate in other contexts, let alone at the national level. An analysis by the Istituto Cattaneo also suggests that while the center-left coalition won in several municipalities during the recent local elections, it has lost overall support compared to the 2022 elections.
Carlo Calenda, leader of Azione, has expressed skepticism about the idea that recent municipal election victories for candidates backed by various opposition parties indicate a successful result for the so-called “Campo Largo” (broad alliance). He argued instead that these successes were due to the strength and specific features of the individual candidates. However, understanding what Calenda actually thinks is becoming increasingly difficult—not that it was ever particularly easy. In an interview with Il Corriere della Sera, when asked why Azione supported Ilaria Salis despite tensions with M5S (Movimento 5 Stelle) leader Giuseppe Conte, Calenda replied: “In city governments, the issues to be addressed are different,” emphasizing that there is no discussion of high politics topics—such as rearmament, Russia, nuclear energy, or foreign policy—and stressing that on these points, the differences remain substantial. This position, however, directly contradicts what Calenda said just weeks earlier, when he ruled out any form of local alliance with the M5S after condemning Conte for defending certain comments by U.S. President Donald Trump on the war in Ukraine that were sympathetic to Russia. Amid this intellectual and political confusion, Calenda has also signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue with Forza Italia, particularly with an eye toward the 2027 municipal elections in Milan. Well, I confess: I give up. I can’t make sense of Calenda. Trying to understand Calenda is hopeless. If anyone actually does, hats off to them.
Moody’s has confirmed Italy’s Baa3 rating and upgraded its outlook from stable to positive, citing improved budget prospects and a stable political environment. Meanwhile, in just two days, orders for the new BTP Italia—a government bond indexed to Italian inflation—have reached €5.28 billion, with €2.14 billion collected on the second day alone. Despite these encouraging developments, significant signs of economic distress remain. Emanuele Orsini, president of Confindustria, has proposed a comprehensive industrial plan aimed at revitalizing both the Italian and European economies. He emphasized the need for a new social pact to address workplace fatalities and low wages, while also calling for reduced energy costs and streamlined regulations to boost competitiveness. At the same time, as Italian enterprises continue to push for industrial revitalization, the country’s human capital continues to deteriorate. A report by the Agnelli & Rocca foundations reveals that students in Southern Italy are lagging behind their peers by as much as two years, largely due to organizational shortcomings in schools—despite the availability of both teachers and resources.
The M5S is revamping its candidacy rules by eliminating the two-term limit, allowing prominent figures to run again under certain conditions—including a new ethical code that requires member approval for re-nominations. Thanks to this change, all the big names in the M5S are now “eligible” for re-election: Fico, Crimi, Bonafede, Taverna, Raggi, Appendino, Patuanelli, Ricciardi, Perilli, and Castaldi. Who knows what those who left the movement will do now… In the meantime, Antonio Iovino—another lost talent of the M5S diaspora—got his additional Warholian fifteen minutes of fame, after the years in the Parliament—where he was a close associate of Luigi Di Maio—by insulting a professor at the University of Salerno (Fisciano campus) who, allegedly, hates him because he was an MP. Well, at least, there is some good news here: Iovino has decided to study (I mean, if he is at the university…)!
During a meeting with the president of Abruzzo, Marco Marsilio, Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Matteo Salvini made a somewhat inelegant joke about Tuscans. When Marsilio pointed out that Montepulciano d’Abruzzo wine is better known and more widely exported than Nobile di Montepulciano, from Tuscany—two different wines with confusingly similar names that have sparked a friendly rivalry between producers—Salvini replied: Ah sì? Meglio, perché i toscani hanno rotto le palle!” (something that can be translated, not literally, as: “Yeah? Even better, the Tuscans are a pain in the ass.”) The remark immediately drew criticism from Tuscan politicians. The president of Tuscany, Eugenio Giani, condemned the comment, highlighting its lack of institutional decorum. Meanwhile, Lega’s regional secretary in Tuscany, Luca Baroncini, attempted to downplay the incident by calling it “just a joke.” Salvini later also tried to defuse the backlash, saying that for the past six years he’s felt “more Tuscan than Milanese”—a reference to his relationship with Francesca Verdini, who is from Florence. He added that he enjoys both Montepulciano wines and is “surrounded by Tuscans in his life, with joy.” Still, as Siena News pointed out, Salvini’s words echoed a well-known scene from the cult TV series Boris, in which one of the main characters, the flamboyant and over-the-top Stanis La Rochelle, insults Tuscan people.
Which only reinforces what I already told you last week: Italy increasingly feels like a real-life version of Boris—a show everyone needs to watch to better understand this country, at least once. Salvini’s words look a bit random at first sight. But then: who’s the new rising star inside La Lega, particularly strong in Tuscany? Who? Roberto Vannacci? The general? Ah! That same Vannacci whom Salvini appointed as deputy secretary of the party, but who now wants to run in the regional elections in Tuscany with his own list, even for the presidency, because he disagreed with the proposed candidates? Well, maybe—just maybe—Salvini’s comment wasn’t exactly a “Voce del sen fuggita” (a slip of the tongue) after all. Who knows…
See also…
Politica Estera - Deep Dive - Meloni’s Transatlantic Bridge: Fragile, but Still Standing
Politica Estera - Deep Dive - The Race for Villa Firenze: Who Will Be Italy’s Next Ambassador to D.C.?
Mediterraneo Globale: La nuova lotta per il potere in Libia
Politica Estera - The Italian Compass - #7/2025
Politica Estera - Bar Italia - #9/2025
Politica Estera - Scriptorium Italiae #2/2025